Robbery and Race by Brendan O'Flaherty & Rajiv Sethi
Racial Stereotypes and Robbery￿
Brendan O￿ Flahertyy Rajiv Sethiz
December 23, 2004
Abstract
Robbery is a serious, widespread and sometimes violent crime resulting each year in costs to
victims of several billion dollars. Data on the incidence of robbery reveals certain striking racial
disparities. African Americans are more likely to be victims, arrestees and prisoners than are
members of other demographic groups, and while black-on-white robberies are very common,
white-on-black robberies are extremely rare. The disparities for robbery are also much greater
than those for other crimes of acquisition. We develop a model of robbery that attempts to
address these and other stylized facts. The key insight underlying the model is that robberies are
typically interactions between strangers which involve a sequence of rapid decisions with severely
limited information. Potential o⁄enders must assess the likelihood of victim resistance, and
victims must assess the likelihood that resistance will be met with violence. Racial disparities in
the distribution of income can cause such probability assessments to be race-contingent, a⁄ecting
crime rates as well as rates of resistance and violence. We argue that this model helps account for
several empirical regularities that appear puzzling from the perspective of alternative theories
of crime.
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Robbery is a very serious crime, often involving violence, and resulting each year in aggregate
costs to victims of several billion dollars.1 It is also a crime that involves signi￿cant and persistent
racial disparities. African-Americans are considerably more likely to be robbery victims, arrestees,
and prisoners than either whites or Hispanics.2 No other crimes except murder and possibly drug
tra¢ cking are nearly so concentrated among African-Americans. But robberies are about forty
times as common as murders, and more state prison inmates are incarcerated for robbery than for
any other index crime.3
Even more striking is the fact that while white-on-white, black-on-black, and black-on-white
robberies are all very common, white-on-black robberies are extremely rare. Robberies with white
victims and black o⁄enders are more than twelve times as frequent as those with black victims
and white o⁄enders.4 Since white criminals are plentiful, the paucity of white-on-black robberies
is puzzling. This phenomenon runs counter to some common beliefs about racism: if whites dis-
like blacks, or if law enforcement undervalues black safety, or if courts are reluctant to accept
black testimony against whites, then white criminals should eagerly rob blacks. The abundance of
black-on-white robbery is also somewhat surprising. Although the overwhelming majority of black
robbers￿victims would be white if robbers were sorted to victims completely randomly, most other
1The direct cost to a victim of a robbery with injury is on average $19,000; the cost of a robbery without injury is
about $2,000 (Miller, Cohen and Wiersma, 1996). These estimates include property damage, medical expenses, lost
productivity, and intangible reduction in the quality of life. Updating to 2002, a year in which around half-a-million
robberies occurred, implies costs to robbery victims of about $5.4 billion. These estimates do not include the costs
of precautions, fear, or heightened racial friction and segregation that robbery might cause.
2Relative to whites in 2002, African-Americans were 2.16 times as likely to be robbery victims in 2002, and 8.55
times as likely to be arrested for robbery. Relative to non-Hispanic whites, African-Americans were 16.1 times as
likely to be incarcerated in a state prison for robbery. Relative to Hispanics, African Americans are 1.68 times as
likely to be victims and 3.51 times as likely to be prisoners. In New York State in 1999, African-Americans were
2.85 times as likely to be arrested for robbery as Hispanics (Sources: National Criminal Victimization Survey 2002,
Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics, table 4.10; Harrison and Beck, 2004, table 15; New York State Division of
Criminal Justice Statistics 2004, the Statistical Abstract, table 13, and American FactFinder.) The population base
for arrests and prisoners is population over 18 (census); for victimization, population over 12 (NCVS).
3Around 151,000 individuals were incarcerated for robbery in 2002, of whom 91,000 were African-American (Har-
rison and Beck, 2004, table 15). 16.6% of African-Americans in prison have been convicted of robbery, more than
any other index crime.
4Detailed evidence on these disparities is provided in Section 2 below.
2crime seems to be concentrated within groups.5
What accounts for such systematic racial disparities? Answering this question is the chief goal of
this paper. We argue that the key to understanding racial disparities in the prevalence of robberies
is to recognize that they involve dynamic interactions among strangers under conditions of incom-
plete information. Victims of attempted robberies may choose to comply or resist, and o⁄enders
may respond to resistance by ￿ eeing or attempting to force compliance through violence. Because
members of di⁄erent groups are drawn from di⁄erent distributions of unobserved characteristics,
they will be treated di⁄erently and will therefore face di⁄erent incentives.6 Hence two individu-
als who share the same non-racial characteristics will exhibit systematic di⁄erences in equilibrium
behavior. Speci￿cally, the likelihood of victim resistance can depend on the perceived race of the of-
fender, and hence make robbery itself more lucrative for members of groups who face less resistance.
This interdependence of victim and o⁄ender conjectures makes robbery di⁄erent from other crimes
of acquisition (such as burglary and theft) and explains why blacks are more disproportionately
involved with robbery than with these other crimes.7 Intimidation is no advantage for a burglar
or thief, but it is for a robber. To the extent that whites ￿nd blacks intimidating, black criminals
face incentives to eschew burglary and theft and concentrate on robbery.
More concretely, suppose that robbery victims believe that black o⁄enders are more likely than
white ones to use violence in the face of victim resistance. In this case, they will be less likely to resist
black o⁄enders relative to white ones. Other things equal, this results in crime being more lucrative
for blacks relative to whites. Suppose further that potential o⁄enders believe that black victims
are more likely than white ones to resist an attempted robbery. Then o⁄enders of all types will
prefer white victims to black ones. The actual probabilities of violence (conditional on resistance)
and resistance (conditional on being confronted) will be determined in equilibrium, and equilibrium
beliefs must accurately re￿ ect these objective probabilities. How might the beliefs described above
arise in equilibrium without any innate group di⁄erences in the propensity for violence? This can
happen if the probabilities of victim resistance and o⁄ender violence are correlated with such
5While 72% of the victims of black robbers were white, only 16% of the victims of black murderers were white,
26% of the victims of black rapists, and 53% of the victims of black assailants (Fox and Zawitz, 2004; NCVS 2002,
table 42).
6By ￿unobserved￿we mean characteristics that other participants in a robbery do not observe, not characteristics
that econometricians do not usually observe. For example, the personal income of a robbery victim is typically
unobservable to a potential o⁄ender.
7Regarding incarceration, for instance, the disproportion for blacks relative to non-Hispanic whites was 6.6 for
burglary and 8.6 for theft, as compared with 16.1 for robbery.
3characteristics as personal income or wealth, which are unobservable to the participants in a robbery,
but which exhibit systematic and well-known di⁄erences across groups. For instance, if poorer
o⁄enders are more likely to use violence in an attempt to force compliance, and if poorer victims
are more likely to resist robbery attempts, then racial income disparities can cause both victims and
o⁄enders to condition their actions on the perceived race of those with whom they are interacting.
We show how this can account for the racial disparities in crime rates, as well as the enormous gap
between black-on-white relative to white-on-black robberies.
Our theory also has empirical implications for rates of resistance and violence. We show that
a uniform deterrence policy that makes robberies of all types less lucrative for o⁄enders has the
e⁄ect of lowering crime rates but of increasing the likelihood of violence conditional on resistance.
The reason is that such policies lead to the disproportionate exit from the robber population of
those potential o⁄enders who are least prone to violence. Those who continue to rob are therefore
more likely to be violent in the face of resistance. These predictions accord with the empirical
record￿ while robberies overall declined by more than a half over the period 1993-2002, robberies
involving injury declined at a much lower rate, and hence the proportion of robberies involving
violence rose steadily.8
The model also implies systematic racial di⁄erences in rates of resistance and violence. For
instance, we predict that o⁄enders of all types will be less likely to resort to violence when facing
resistance from white (rather than black) victims. This latter prediction is surprising, and follows
from the fact that those potential robbers who confront only white victims are less prone to violence
than those who confront victims of all types. The model also predicts that victims of all types will
o⁄er less resistance to black (relative to white) o⁄enders. A ￿rst look at the data over the ten year
period 1993-2002 provides some support for both of these predictions. On the other hand, we ￿nd
that in the case of black-on-white robberies, the extent of resistance is higher, and the likelihood
of violence lower than one would predict on the basis of the model. These ￿ndings are tentative,
however, and a systematic empirical exploration is well beyond the scope of the present paper.
We begin in Section 2 with the legal de￿nition of robbery and a further discussion of the
empirical regularities that motivate this work. Section 3 contains a model of robbery which attempts
to capture the essential features￿ sequential choice under incomplete information￿ described above.
Section 4 uses the model to examine the e⁄ects of two kinds of law enforcement policies, deterrence
and incapacitation, on robbery rates and on the incidence of resistance and violence. Section 5
8Section 4 contains further details on recent changes in robbery rates, violence and resistance.
4extends the model to the case in which beliefs are conditioned on racial categorization, and shows
how the racial disparities evident in the data can arise in equilibrium. Section 6 considers alternative
hypotheses that have been advanced to account for racial disparities in the incidence of criminal
behavior, and argues that they inadequate in explaining both the extent and the nature of the
disparity. Section 7 concludes.
2 De￿nitions and Evidence
In the United States, robbery is de￿ned as ￿taking, or attempting to take, anything of value from
the care, custody, or control of a person or persons by force or threat of force or violence and/or
by putting the victim in fear￿(Sourcebook, 2002, p. 570). Examples are muggings, hold-ups, and
confrontations where one teenager scares another into giving up his coat. Unsuccessful attempts
count as robberies.
Robbery is distinguished from other crimes of property acquisition by the use or threat of
force. Burglary, for instance, involves entering a structure to take something without confronting
a person, and theft involves activities like shoplifting where no personal confrontation occurs.
Personal confrontation is a necessary element of robbery. Stealing a car with nobody in it is
motor vehicle theft; stealing a car with someone in it (a carjacking) is robbery. Robbery di⁄ers
from assault, another crime of personal confrontation, because its purpose is acquisition. Barroom
brawls and domestic violence are assaults because o⁄enders are not trying to acquire money or
property from their victims.9
African-Americans are considerably more likely to be arrested and imprisoned for robbery rela-
tive to other groups. This does not necessarily imply that African-Americans commit robberies at
a higher rate than members of other racial or ethnic groups since it cannot be reasonably assumed
that the criminal justice system is free of bias. The consensus among criminologists who have
studied the question for many years, however, is that African-Americans do commit robberies at
considerably higher rates than whites or Hispanics. The relative disparities in o⁄ending proba-
bly approach the relative disparities in arrests or incarceration. A review article by Sampson and
Lauritsen (1997) summarizes the consensus:
9A small number of robberies turn into murders when victims die. The classi￿cation of ￿murder￿ trumps the
classi￿cation of ￿robbery.￿For our purposes, these crimes should be considered robberies, but government agencies
do not keep data in this fashion. The number of felony-murders, however, is small￿ less than half a percent of the
number of robberies￿ and so we will ignore these crimes.
5While limitations exist for both o¢ cial and self-report data, it thus appears that race
di⁄erences in o⁄ending as recorded in arrest reports and victimization surveys re￿ ect
real di⁄erences in the frequency and seriousness of delinquent acts.
Some of the most useful data on this question come from the National Criminal Victimiza-
tion Survey (NCVS), a household survey that asks about crime experiences. Part of the survey
asks crime victims about the people who committed crimes against them. Of victims of single
o⁄ender robberies in 2002 who could identify the robber￿ s race, 46% said that the robber was black
(NCVS 2002, table 40). In robberies with multiple o⁄enders, 45% of victims who could identify
the race of their robbers said they were all black; another 16% said the group robbing them were
of mixed race (NCVS 2002, table 46). These proportions are almost as high as the proportions of
African-Americans among robbery arrestees and prisoners. Table 1 provides more detail on victim
identi￿cations for single-o⁄ender robberies (NCVS 2002, table 42).
Table 1: Victim Identi￿cation of Robbers, 2002 (Single O⁄ender Robberies)
Proportion of total single o⁄ender robberies where identi￿cation was made
Perceived race of robber
White Black Other Total
White 0:399 0:331 0:104 0:734
Race of victim Black 0:027 0:226 0:013 0:266
Total 0:426 0:457 0:117 1:000
The most striking feature of this table is the large di⁄erence between the number of black-on-
white robberies and the number of white-on-black robberies.10 The latter are virtually non-existent.
2002 is not an anomaly in this regard; in 2001 the survey did not ￿nd any white victim of a black
single-o⁄ender robbery. Similar patterns arise in the case of multiple o⁄ender robberies: in the 2002
survey over 30% of all such robberies involved a white victim and an all-black group of o⁄enders,
while none involved a black victim and an all-white group of o⁄enders.11 Our model addresses and
accounts for this ￿nding, as well as the disproportionate prevalence of blacks among the population
of o⁄enders.
10Standard errors are 0.054 (white-on-white), 0.052 (black-on-white), 0.017 (white-on-black) and 0.045 (black-on-
black).
11One problem with the NCVS, however, is that it observes very few actual robberies. Although it samples between
63 A Model of Attempted Robbery
3.1 Preliminaries
The key elements of a robbery are personal confrontation (typically between strangers), the threat
or use of force, and the attempt to obtain property. Such interactions involve a sequence of rapid
decisions made by victims and o⁄enders, and these decisions must be made under severe infor-
mational constraints. Under such conditions racial classi￿cation can in￿ uence the actions of both
parties. Our model is an attempt to capture these e⁄ects.
When a potential robber is faced with an opportunity, he must decide whether or not to make
the robbery attempt. If an attempt is made, the victim can either comply with the robber￿ s
demand or resist it. If faced with resistance, the robber can abandon the attempt and ￿ ee, or can
try to force compliance through violence. When contemplating a robbery attempt, the perpetrator
typically cannot know whether the victim will resist. Similarly, when contemplating resistance, the
victim cannot know whether the robber will ￿ ee or attempt to force compliance. Resistance by the
victim followed by an attempt at forced compliance is potentially very costly to both parties - both
face the risk of serious injury, and the robber faces both an increased likelihood of arrest as well
as more severe punishment conditional on arrest. The most desirable outcome from the robber￿ s
perspective is compliance by the victim. The most desirable outcome from the perspective of the
potential victim is a decision by the potential robber not to make the robbery attempt in the ￿rst
place. Conditional on a robbery attempt the victim￿ s best response is to resist if she believes that
the robber will ￿ ee, and to comply if she believes that the robber will use force. Conditional on
victim resistance, the robber￿ s best response may be to ￿ ee, or it may be to use violence in order
to force compliance. And the payo⁄s to both robber and victim are somewhat lower in the case of
a failed robbery attempt (when resistance is met with ￿ ight) than if no attempt had been made in
the ￿rst place.
These payo⁄considerations can be expressed in the form of a simple two-player game with three
stages, as shown in Figure 1. At the ￿rst stage, the potential robber (player 1) decides whether or
not to attempt to rob the potential victim (player 2). If there is no confrontation, payo⁄s of both
players are normalized to equal zero. In this case each player retains her initial level of wealth. If
75,000 and 100,000 individuals a year, the total number of robberies observed annually ranges from just 165 (in 2002)
to about 600 ( in 1993). Accordingly, sampling errors for particular types of robbery (for instance black-on-black
single o⁄ender robberies that are completed without violence) are large.
7the robber confronts the victim, the latter can either resist or comply with the robber￿ s demand. If
the victim complies, the payo⁄s are x1 to the robber and ￿x2 to the victim. If the victim resists the
robber can then either ￿ ee or attempt to force compliance. If the robber ￿ ees, the payo⁄s are ￿y1
to the robber and ￿y2 to the victim. If the robber attempts to force compliance through violence,












































Figure 1: Dynamics of an Attempted Robbery
A key aspect of robbery that we wish to capture is robber uncertainty about the victim￿ s
likelihood of resistance, as well as victim uncertainty about the robber￿ s propensity to respond
violently to resistance. We allow for heterogeneity in preferences and incomplete information as
follows. Suppose that each of the two players is drawn from a set of types ￿ = [￿min;￿max];
such that a player￿ s type ￿ 2 ￿ completely de￿nes her preferences over all outcomes in the game.
One interpretation of a player￿ s type is her outside option or initial wealth level, although other
interpretations are possible.
We intend ￿ to describe the characteristics of the robber and the victim that are unobservable
during the attempted robbery. Given the potential robber￿ s observable characteristics the distrib-
ution of robber types is commonly known and is described by the continuous distribution function
F(￿) : ￿ ! [0;1]. Similarly, given the victim￿ s observable characteristics, the distribution of victim
types is commonly known and is described by the continuous distribution function G(￿) : ￿ ! [0;1].
We allow for the possibility that F and G are identical, although in general (if robber and victim
have di⁄erent observable characteristics) these two functions will di⁄er.12
12In section 5 we explicitly introduce race as an observable characteristic and explore the implications of this for
8The payo⁄s xi(￿); yi(￿); and zi(￿) are all fully determined by the player￿ s type and are assumed
to be di⁄erentiable functions of ￿. We assume that robbers of all types gain from a robbery
attempt that is successful without violence, but lose from an unsuccessful attempt. This is relative
to the zero-payo⁄ baseline in which no robbery attempt is made. Furthermore, we assume that
victims of all types rank the four possible outcomes in the same order: from the victim￿ s point of
view, violent robberies are worse than successful non-violent ones, which in turn are worse than
unsuccessful robbery attempts. Hence a victim who is certain that resistance will be met with ￿ ight
will resist, and one who is certain that resistance will be met with violence will comply. Best of
all is the outcome in which no attempt at robbery is made in the ￿rst place. These considerations
imply the following:
Assumption 1. For all ￿ 2 ￿; x1 (￿) > 0; y1 (￿) > 0; and z2 (￿) > x2 (￿) > y2 (￿) > 0:
In addition, we assume that victims of higher type lose less when successfully robbed, but lose more
when subjected to violence. This is motivated by the interpretation of ￿ as an outside option or
initial wealth level. The rationale is that the wealth transfer that takes place during a successful
robbery is a smaller share of initial wealth for higher types, while the willingness-to-pay to avoid
injury is greater for wealthier individuals. Formally:
Assumption 2. For all ￿ 2 ￿; x0
2 (￿) < 0 < z0
2 (￿):
Next, we assume that robbers with higher ￿ incur higher costs from a violent outcome as well as
from an unsuccessful robbery attempt, and the former costs rise faster than the latter. Wealthier
robbers have more to lose from the harsher penalties or injuries that can result from a violent
outcome, and these costs rise with wealth faster than the relatively minor costs associated with
an unsuccessful robbery attempt. The payo⁄s of victims vary with type in exactly the same way:
wealthier victims incur greater costs from violent outcomes as well as from failed robbery attempts,
and the former costs rise with wealth more rapidly than the latter costs. This implies the following:
Assumption 3. For all ￿ 2 ￿; and for j = 1;2; z0
j (￿) > y0
j (￿).
Finally, we assume that robbers with very low wealth levels prefer to respond violently when faced
with resistance, while those with higher wealth levels prefer to ￿ ee. Furthermore, individuals with
equilibrium behavior. More generally, such attributes as age, weight, gender, manner of dress and speaking, presence
of eyeglasses or facial scars, or visible possession of a weapon could all be observable attributes which a⁄ect beliefs.
9su¢ ciently low wealth prefer to attempt robbery even if they are certain of resistance. The rationale
is that poorer robbers have more to gain from the completion of the robbery, and hence the higher
probability of capture (and the more severe penalties conditional on capture) that violence entails
are less of a disincentive. Hence we have:
Assumption 4. z1(￿min) < 0 and z1(￿max) > y1(￿max):
Assumptions 1-4 together imply that for any given beliefs of the victim regarding the probability
with which resistance will be met with violence, lower wealth victims will be more likely to resist
relative to higher wealth victims. They also imply that for any given robber beliefs about the
probability of victim resistance, lower wealth individuals will be more likely to attempt robbery.
We have motivated our discussion of types by interpreting ￿ as wealth or income￿ an unobserv-
able variable that reduces a robber￿ s willingness to use violence and increases a victim￿ s expected
losses from a violent encounter. Wealth, of course, is not the only variable that has this property.
For instance, unobserved psychological and moral propensities, real or imagined, clearly play a role
in how people react in stressful situations. It is probably most appropriate to think of ￿ as a latent
variable that is a function of both wealth and a set of psychological variables.13
The game tree depicted in Figure 1, together with the common priors F(￿) and G(￿), over
player types and the functions xi (￿); yi (￿) and zi (￿) together de￿ne an extensive-form Bayesian
game ￿: We next characterize the Perfect Bayesian Equilibria of this game.
3.2 Equilibrium
Consider a victim who has been confronted by a robber and believes that resistance will be met
with violence with probability ￿: In this case the victim will comply if her type ￿ is such that
x2(￿) < ￿z2(￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)y2(￿) (1)
and resist if the inequality is reversed. Since x2 is strictly decreasing and both y2 and z2 are
increasing, there will exist some threshold type ~ ￿(￿) such that victims will comply if their wealth
exceeds ~ ￿(￿) and resist if it lies below it. The probability that a robber will meet resistance is
then simply G(~ ￿): The threshold ~ ￿ is itself strictly decreasing in ￿; the greater the expectation of
violence, the smaller the set of victims who resist.
13Empirical considerations also require this richer interpretation of ￿: Hispanics have about the same distribution
of income and wealth as blacks, but are arrested for far fewer robberies. Explaining why the black distribution of ￿
has come to be di⁄erent from the Hispanic distribution is a topic for future research.
10Now suppose that potential robbers believe that a proportion ￿ of victims will resist if con-
fronted. In this case an individual of type ￿ will attempt robbery if
(1 ￿ ￿)x1(￿) > ￿minfy1 (￿);z1 (￿)g; (2)
and refrain from doing so if the inequality is reversed. Since z1(￿min) < 0 and x1 > 0 for all ￿; indi-
viduals who are of su¢ ciently low type will attempt robbery. Furthermore, since minfy1 (￿);z1 (￿)g
is increasing and x1(￿) is decreasing, there exists some type ^ ￿ > ￿min such that all types below
^ ￿ attempt robbery and all types above ^ ￿ do not. The threshold ^ ￿ is strictly decreasing in ￿.
Of the types who attempt robbery, a subset will use violence if they meet with resistance. Let
￿ ￿ 2 (￿min;￿max) denote the unique solution to the equation y1 (￿) = z1 (￿):14 Then the proportion
of robbers who are prepared to use violence is given by F(￿ ￿)=F(^ ￿) if ^ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ and 1 otherwise.
In equilibrium, the beliefs of both robbers and victims must be consistent with the strategies










￿￿ = G(~ ￿(￿￿)): (4)
Given our assumptions, the following holds (see the appendix for proofs of all formal results):
Proposition 1. ￿ has a unique equilibrium (￿￿;￿￿); and ￿￿ 2 (0;1):


















In equilibrium, some types attempt robbery while others do not. The set of types who attempt
robbery include some who ￿ ee when met with resistance, and also some who resort to violence.
Hence there are three types of crime that can arise with positive probability: (i) nonviolent rob-
beries, (ii) violent robberies, and (iii) failed attempted robberies. The rates at which these occur
14Uniqueness and interiority of ￿ ￿ follows from assumptions 3 and 4 above.
11depend on the type distribution in the population and the manner in which types are related to
payo⁄s through the functions xi; yi; and zi: Given the payo⁄ and distribution functions, rates of
crime, violence and resistance are uniquely determined.
3.3 Crime Rates
Given the equilibrium values (￿￿;￿￿); determined jointly by the conditions (4) and (5), the overall
crime rate (aggregating the three types of crimes) is given by ￿￿ = F(^ ￿(￿￿)): The proportion of
robbery attempts that are successful without violence is simply 1￿￿￿. The proportion of robbery
attempts that fail are ￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿￿); and the proportion that end in violence are ￿￿￿￿:
Many of the equilibrium parameters can be recovered directly from empirical data￿ assuming
that the distribution from which robbers are drawn is the same in all encounters, as is the distribu-
tion from which victims are drawn.15 For instance, the NCVS shows the following as the outcomes
of all single-o⁄ender robberies in 2002:
Table 2: Composition of Robberies, 2002
Completed Not completed
With injury 25:8% 13:0%
Without injury 41:7% 19:4%
Here ￿completed￿means robberies where something of value was acquired from the victim. The
bottom left cell, ￿completed, without injury￿ is the proportion of robbery attempts successful
without violence, 1 ￿ ￿￿. Hence we estimate
￿￿ = 0:583
for all robberies in 2002 (under our very strong assumption of no relevant di⁄erences in observable
characteristics). The bottom right cell, ￿not completed, without injury,￿is the proportion of failed
robbery attempts, ￿￿(1 ￿ ￿￿). Hence we can estimate
￿￿(1 ￿ ￿￿) = 0:194
and so
￿￿ = 0:667
15These assumptions will be relaxed in Section 5 below, where we allow for race-contingent di⁄erences in beliefs.
12Standard errors for our estimates of ￿￿ and ￿￿ are 0:056 and 0:069 respectively. Since we do
not know how many possible encounters do not occur because the potential robber decides not to
initiate a robbery attempt, we have little empirical information on ￿￿.
This method has another weakness, in addition to the assumption of the irrelevance of ob-
served characteristics. Some robberies do not conform to the game-theoretic model we have been
discussing. Sometimes robbers will simply strike their victims ￿rst and forcibly remove valuables,
instead of making demands and letting victims decide whether to comply. These crimes will appear
in the upper left-hand corner, ￿completed, with violence,￿along with crimes where the robbery
follows our model. If we were able to purge strike-￿rst robberies from the data, our estimates of
￿￿and ￿￿ would both decrease.
4 Deterrence and Incapacitation
Many discussions of criminal justice policy revolve around the relative e⁄ectiveness of deterrence
and incapacitation, broadly de￿ned. Deterrence policies attempt to make crime less attractive to
all types of potential criminals by increasing the expected punishment that follows commission of a
crime. Incapacitation policies attempt to alter the distribution of types in the population without
changing the propensity of any given type to commit crime. Broadly construed, incapacitation
policies thus include not only imprisonment but also education, rehabilitation, the encouragement
of religion and morality, and possibly access to abortion.
In our model, incapacitation policies alter the distribution of robber types, while deterrence
policies change the robbers￿payo⁄ functions. Since our model includes three di⁄erent kinds of
robberies (failed, successful without violence, and successful with violence), there are at least three
di⁄erent kinds of deterrence policy. In particular, we are interested in the manner in which changes
in the functions x1; y1 and z1 a⁄ect the equilibrium values of ￿￿ and ￿￿: Three types of changes
are possible: (i) harsher penalties from violence, which we interpret as an upward shift in the z1 (￿)
function, (ii) smaller expected rewards for successful robberies, which we interpret as a downward
shift in x1 (￿); and (iii) harsher penalties for failed attempts at robbery, or a rise in y1 (￿):
Proposition 2. Harsher penalties for violence result in a declines in ￿￿ and ￿￿; and a rise in ￿￿:
Smaller rewards for successful robberies, or harsher penalties for failed robbery attempts, result in
a rise in ￿￿; and declines in ￿￿ and ￿￿:
13As might be expected, all deterrence policies result in a lowering of the crime rate ￿￿. The e⁄ects
on the prevalence of resistance and violence depend, however, on the details of the policy. Harsher
penalties for violence reduce the equilibrium likelihood that resistance will be met with violence, and
result therefore in greater resistance. While the overall proportion of robberies ending in violence is
indeterminate (since resistance is higher) the proportion that are successful without violence falls,
as does the overall crime rate.
Smaller rewards for successful robberies could arise either from a higher likelihood of subsequent
apprehension, harsher penalties conditional on apprehension, or a decline in the amount of cash
and other valuables held by potential victims. While this deterrence policy also results in a lower
crime rate, the probability of violence contingent on resistance rises, and the extent of resistance
accordingly declines. The reason for this is that the decline in crime rate results from the exit
of robbers with higher ￿; who are also less prone to violence; the robbers who remain are lower
￿ types who are more likely to be violent. Lower resistance implies that a greater proportion of
attempted robberies are successful, and a greater proportion of resisted robberies end in violence.
Higher penalties for failed robbery attempts have exactly the same e⁄ect.
In practice, any given policy that changes penalties or rewards will simultaneously a⁄ect all
three functions x1; y1; and z1: Proposition 2 can be used collectively to determine the direction of
these e⁄ects, although in some cases unambiguous predictions may not be possible. One case in
which unambiguous predictions can be made is that in which expected penalties for all kinds of
robbery increase by the same amount. We say that a uniform deterrence policy is imposed if, for
all ￿, x1(￿) decreases by some amount k > 0, and y1(￿) and z1(￿) increase by k. Qualitatively,
uniform deterrence increases look like increases in penalties for failed robberies:
Proposition 3. A uniform deterrence policy results in a rise in ￿￿, and declines in ￿￿ and ￿￿:
These results yield empirical predictions. A uniform deterrence increase or an increase in
the penalties for failed robberies should raise the proportion of robberies that are successful and
nonviolent (1 ￿ ￿￿), and cut the proportion of failed robberies ￿￿(1 ￿ ￿￿). The e⁄ect on violent
robberies ￿￿￿￿ is ambiguous. On the other hand, harsher penalties for violent robberies should
reduce the proportion of successful nonviolent robberies and raise the proportion of failed robberies.
14Table 3: Changes in Robberies by Kind 1993-2002 (1993 = 100)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Completed, with injury 100 119 87 115 127 75 93 59 72 66
Failed, with injury 100 114 63 73 80 79 64 75 97 65
Completed, no injury 100 116 129 122 83 121 100 93 61 52
Failed, no injury 100 90 83 91 66 54 49 36 37 22
Total 100 107 99 105 84 85 77 65 58 45
Since the overall incidence of robbery fell dramatically during the 1990s, these results let us
begin to assess what sort of impact deterrence policies may have had. Table 3 shows the changes in
each of the four classes of single-o⁄ender robbery between 1993 and 2002, a period over which the
aggregate decline was 55%: Several patterns are evident in the table. Robberies involving injuries
declined less than robberies overall, so the share of violent robberies in total robberies increased over
this period. The sharpest declines occurred in failed robbery attempts (without injury), suggesting
that conditional on resistance, the incidence of violence rose. Successful robberies without injury
declined somewhat less than robberies overall, suggesting that rates of resistance fell slightly over
the period. Direct computation of rates of resistance and violence con￿rms that there was a steady
increase in ￿; with a modest (but insigni￿cant) decline in ￿ over this period (Table 4).16 This
trend is not compatible with an exclusive reliance on harsher penalties for violent crimes, but it is
consistent with the other kinds of deterrence measures, including a uniform deterrence policy.
Table 4: Changes in rates of violence and resistance, 1993-2002
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
￿ 0:431 0:497 0:416 0:456 0:561 0:516 0:560 0:578 0:625 0:694
￿ 0:627 0:597 0:514 0:567 0:635 0:469 0:517 0:467 0:606 0:570
Finally, consider the e⁄ects of incapacitation, which we interpret as changes in distribution of
robber types.17
16Standard errors range from 0:030 to 0:048 (for estimates of ￿) and from 0:024 to 0:042 (for estimates of ￿).
17Such a shift could also be induced by an increase in the overall prosperity of the population from which potential
robbers are drawn.
15Proposition 4. A shift to the right in the type distribution of potential robbers (a decline in F (￿)
at every ￿) results in a decline in ￿￿.
In general we cannot tell how ￿￿ and ￿￿ will react to a change in the distribution of criminal types
without specifying more precisely how the distribution of types changes. However, a policy that
disproportionately incapacitates potential robbers with low ￿ will lower ￿￿ and raise ￿￿: To see
this, suppose we start at some distribution F and move to a new distribution H that stochastically
dominates F. In other words, H (￿)=F (￿) ￿ 1. If the movement from F to H disproportionately
incapacitates the potential robbers with the smallest ￿, then H (￿)=F (￿) will be an increasing
function. We say that incapacitation is directed at the violent if H (￿)=F (￿) ￿ 1 and is increasing
for all ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿. For future reference, when H(￿) and F(￿) are such that H that stochastically
dominates F and H(￿)=F(￿) is increasing, we shall say that F(￿) is strongly tougher than H(￿):
Then we have
Proposition 5. A policy of incapacitation directed at the violent decreases ￿￿ and raises ￿￿.
Intuitively, reducing the proportion of robbers who are most inclined to violence makes the average
remaining robber less violent, and so makes victims more inclined to resist. Since ￿ in fact rose
steadily over the period 1993-2002, the decline in robbery rates over this period cannot be attributed
simply to the incarceration of the most violent criminals.
Our model also allows us to see how changes in the incentives and characteristics of victims
a⁄ect the number and kind of robberies. Emergency medical systems, and insurance and victim
compensation policies, for instance, can change victims￿expected payo⁄s. Changes in prosperity
can also change the distribution of victim types. For brevity, we can consider changes in payo⁄
functions and changes in distribution functions together:
Proposition 6. An increase in the expected cost to victims of violence (higher z2(￿) for all ￿) or
a shift to the right in the distribution of victim types (lower G(￿) for all ￿), reduces ￿￿ and ￿￿,
and raises ￿￿.
Both of these changes, then, lead to a smaller proportion of violent robberies, and a higher propor-
tion of successful nonviolent robberies. The prediction for failed robberies is ambiguous.
We can test these predictions by comparing robberies with ￿rearms to robberies where no
weapon is used (based on victim reports). We ignore robberies with other kinds of weapons. For
16victims, ￿rearms make the consequences of violence much worse, and so Proposition 6 applies. In
the 2002 NCVS (table 66), 48.1% of robberies where the robber had no weapons ended up with
the victim injured, compared with 20.7% of robberies where the robber had a ￿rearm. This is very
much in accord with Proposition 6. Our estimate of ￿￿ is 0.675 (standard error 0:063) with no
weapons, and 0.370 (standard error 0:080) with a ￿rearm. Victims are much less likely to resist
when the robber has a ￿rearm. Somewhat less intuitively, the presence of a ￿rearm makes ￿￿ fall
from 0.713 (standard error 0.073) to 0.559 (standard error 0.133) although this di⁄erence is not
signi￿cant at conventional levels. Our model thus captures the essential features of how these two
varieties of robbery di⁄er. Firearms have two distinct e⁄ects: they raise the costs of resistance (thus
lowering the incidence of resistance) and they induce non-violent robbers to enter the business (thus
lowering the incidence of violence conditional on resistance).
5 Explaining Racial Disparities
The model so far has assumed, in e⁄ect, that all robbers and victims have the same observable
characteristics. In order to address and account for the kind of racial disparities identi￿ed in
the introduction, this assumption needs to be relaxed. We do so as follows. Suppose that each
individual belongs to one of two identi￿able groups, blacks and whites, and that the groups di⁄er
with respect to their type distributions. Let Fb (￿) and Fw (￿) denote the distribution functions for
robbers in the two groups respectively. Let Gb (￿) and Gw (￿) denote the distribution functions for
victims in the two groups respectively. Suppose that all other functions xi; yi and zi are identical
across groups, which implies also that the threshold ￿ ￿ and the functions ^ ￿(￿) and ~ ￿(￿) are the
same.
We know from Proposition 1 that for any given interaction (once the race of both victim
and o⁄ender have been observed), equilibrium behavior is uniquely determined.18 Behavior in
equilibrium will generally be race-contingent. For instance, a victim￿ s decision to resist may depend
on the race of the perpetrator, since this may provide information about the probability with which
18Uniqueness of equilibrium is unusual in models of statistical discrimination descended from Arrow(1973). Since
groups are typically assumed to be ex-ante identical, the existence of an equilibrium with discrimination implies the
existence of another equilibrium in which the positions of the groups are interchanged; see, for instance, Coate and
Loury (1993), Chaudhuri and Sethi (2003), Fryer (2004) and Moro and Norman (2004). In our model, while groups
are ex-ante identical with respect to their preferences, they di⁄er with respect to their respective income distributions,
and this is enough to induce di⁄erences in behavior despite the uniqueness of equilibrium.
17resistance is met with violence. This latter probability may itself depend on the race of the victim,
if a robber￿ s decision to confront a victim is sensitive to the victim￿ s race.
To allow for all these e⁄ects, let ￿ij denote the victim￿ s estimate of the probability with which
resistance will be met with violence when the perpetrator belongs to group i and the victim to group
j: Similarly, let ￿ij denote the robber￿ s perception of the probability with which the victim will
resist when the perpetrator belongs to group i and the victim to group j: The following equilibrium














































denote the crime rate when the perpetrator belongs to group i and the
victim to group j:
The following result establishes that if the white income distribution stochastically dominates
the black income distribution among the population of potential robbers, then blacks will have
higher crime rates than whites against each victim group. Furthermore, if the black income dis-
tribution is strongly tougher than the white distribution, then white o⁄enders will be resisted
more frequently in equilibrium, and are less likely to resort to violence conditional on resistance,
regardless of whether the victim is black or white.19
Proposition 7. Suppose that for all ￿ 2 ￿; Fb (￿) > Fw (￿): Then for each j 2 fb;wg; ￿￿
bj > ￿￿
wj:






Hence black crime rates will be uniformly higher than white crime rates against both black and
white victims if whites are more a› uent than blacks as a group. Note that this e⁄ect occurs despite
the fact that successfully robbing whites is no more lucrative than successfully robbing blacks: we
have assumed that robber payo⁄s are independent of victim types. The reason for the higher crime
19Empirically, the black income distribution is indeed strongly tougher than the white.
18rates is more subtle and can be understood intuitively as follows. Suppose crime rates were uniform
across race. Then blacks would face lower resistance from victims of all groups since, relative to
whites, a greater proportion of those attempting robbery would be willing to use violence. This
follows directly from the hypothesis that the white income distribution stochastically dominates
the black income distribution. Lower resistance makes crime more lucrative, resulting in higher
black crime rates. Note that in equilibrium, it need not be the case that blacks in fact face lower
resistance or that a greater proportion of black o⁄enders are prepared to use violence. Since the
set of types who choose robbery in the black population is larger than the set of types who choose
robbery in the white population, it is entirely possible that a greater proportion of black robbers
are in fact non-violent in equilibrium.
Next consider how rates of crime, resistance and violence vary with the race of the victim,
holding ￿xed that of the robber:








Hence all robbers in both groups exhibit a preference for white over black victims. The probability
of violence conditional on resistance is greater for black victims relative to white. This is because
the pool of o⁄enders willing to confront white victims is larger and hence contains a greater share
of non-violent types. Despite the fact that white victims are less likely to face violence conditional
on resistance, the model predicts that they resist at lower rates than black victims. Hence the e⁄ect
on resistance rates of the fact that whites are richer as a group outweighs the e⁄ect of the fact that
they face a less violent population of robbers in equilibrium.
These theoretical results have certain clear empirical implications for rates of crime, resistance
and violence. While a systematic empirical analysis is well beyond the scope of this paper, we can
provide a tentative assessment of some of these implications using NCVS data.
5.1 Disparities in Crime Rates
Taken together, Propositions 7-8 imply that if the white income distribution stochastically domi-















19Does the empirical evidence support the ordering of crime rates implied by (10)? Since we do
not observe the denominators of crime rates directly, we need to make some assumptions and
calculations to see whether the data roughly support (10). Residential segregation in metropolitan
areas implies that encounters are biased toward within-group members, and any reasonable estimate
of the crime rates ￿bb and ￿ww needs to take this into account. Assuming that robbers confront
only individuals in their own neighborhoods, and encounter potential victims randomly within
neighborhoods, we can use data on segregation from the Lewis Mumford Center (2002) to calculate
the probability of various kinds of encounters, and then use table 1 to infer crime rates. This
procedure has two drawbacks: it ignores robberies outside metropolitan areas, and the Mumford
Center uses di⁄erent racial classi￿cations from those the NCVS uses. But the robbery rate outside
metropolitan areas is quite low, and we can use census data on racial and ethnic cross-tabulations
to make the Mumford Center data roughly congruent with the NCVS. The resulting relative crime
rates (after normalizing the white-on-white rate to equal one) are:
￿wb = 0:39; ￿ww = 1:00; ￿bb = 4:16; ￿bw = 8:74:
The rankings of crime rates are fully in accordance with (10), and the black-on-white crime rate is
an order of magnitude higher than the white-on-black crime rate.20
5.2 Disparities in Resistance and Violence
Propositions 7-8 also make sharp predictions about rates of violence and resistance. Holding con-
stant the race of the o⁄ender, a white victim faces a lower probability that resistance will be met
with violence. Despite this, white victims resist with lower frequency. And holding constant the
race of the victim, black o⁄enders are more likely to resort to violence conditional on resistance,
and are less likely to face resistance in the ￿rst place. How well do these predictions accord with
the evidence? NCVS data for single-o⁄ender robberies can be used to address this question. Since
white-on-black robberies are so rare, we examine the validity of our predictions for the remaining
three categories of crime.
20Since any assumptions about matching imply that the number of times a black meets a white is the same as the




wb remains the same no matter how blacks
and whites are matched.
20Table 5: Rates of violence by race of victim, 1993-2002
1993 1994￿ 1995￿ 1996 1997 1998 1999￿ 2000 2001 2002
￿bw 0.322 0.373 0.242 0.296 0.563 0.480 0.324 0.694 0.754 0.776
￿bb 0.461 0.646 0.652 0.535 0.727 0.518 0.659 0.698 0.522 0.699
One of the less intuitive predictions of the model is that relative to black victims, white victims
face a smaller likelihood of violence conditional on resistance: ￿￿
bw < ￿￿
bb: Aggregating data for
the period 1993-2002, we obtain the estimates ￿bw = 0:448 (standard error 0.029) and ￿bb = 0:614
(standard error 0.037), con￿rming that black victims do, in fact face a considerably higher likelihood
of violence when they choose to resist black o⁄enders. This di⁄erence is statistically signi￿cant.
Table 5 contains the disaggregated data, which shows that despite considerable variation over time
in rates of violence, the predicted inequality is satis￿ed for eight of the ten years in the sample. For
three of these years (denoted by an asterisk) the di⁄erence is statistically signi￿cant at the 5% level.
Moreover, for the two years in which the inequality is not satis￿ed the di⁄erence is insigni￿cant.
Turning to the likelihood of resistance, the model implies that white victims will resist with
greater likelihood when faced with a white (rather than black) o⁄ender: ￿￿
ww > ￿￿
bw: Aggregate
estimates of rates of resistance for the period 1993-2002 are ￿ww = 0:618 (standard error 0.019)
and ￿bw = 0:553 (standard error 0.023), which is consistent with this prediction. This di⁄erence is
statistically signi￿cant. The disaggregated data is shown in Table 6: the inequality holds in seven
of the ten years in the sample, although none of the individual year di⁄erences is signi￿cant.
Table 6: Rates of resistance by race of o⁄ender, 1993-2002
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
￿bw 0.561 0.621 0.570 0.523 0.592 0.512 0.625 0.442 0.549 0.411
￿ww 0.724 0.699 0.491 0.666 0.703 0.466 0.499 0.563 0.674 0.673
Some predictions of the model, however, accord less well with the data. The model predicts
(under the somewhat stronger assumptions of Proposition 7), that white victims will face a higher
likelihood of violence from black (relative to white) o⁄enders: ￿￿
bw > ￿￿
ww: This appears not to be
the case when we look at the period 1993-2002, for which we ￿nd ￿ww = 0:464 > 0:448 = ￿bw in the
aggregate. In other words, white victims appear to face a smaller likelihood of violence from black
(relative to white) o⁄enders than our model predicts. However, this di⁄erence is not statistically
21signi￿cant (standard errors are 0:024 and 0:029 for estimates of ￿ww and ￿bw respectively). In
addition, the model predicts that black o⁄enders will face greater resistance from black victims
than they face from white victims: ￿￿
bw < ￿￿
bb: This too appears not to hold in the aggregate for
the period in question, where we ￿nd ￿bb = 0:479 < 0:550 = ￿bw: This di⁄erence is statistically
signi￿cant (standard errors are 0:027 and 0:023 for estimates of ￿bb and ￿bw respectively). In other
words, black o⁄enders face somewhat more resistance from white victims than one would predict
on the basis of the model. It is conceivable that the higher resistance by white victims (relative to
the model￿ s predictions) is simply a rational response to the lower likelihood of violence they face
from black o⁄enders. This leaves open the question of why black o⁄enders are less violent than
white o⁄enders in interactions with white victims, an empirical puzzle that we hope to address in
future work.
To summarize, the model accounts for the racial disparity in robberies, and in particular the
enormous gap between black-on-white and white-on-black robbery rates. It also makes a number of
predictions about racial di⁄erences in rates of resistance and violence which can be tested against
the empirical record. A preliminary look at the data suggests that some (but not all) of the predicted
patterns appear to arise. Until a systematic empirical investigation is undertaken, however, these
empirical claims must be considered highly tentative.
We turn next to a discussion of alternative theories which have been advanced to account for
racial disparities in crime, and argue that they do not adequately capture the stylized facts that
motivate our analysis.
6 Alternative Explanations
Quite a few theories have been advanced to explain the racial disparity in robbery rates. There are
also ￿common-sense￿folk explanations. In this section we will review some of the more popular
of these theories, and show why they are inadequate. Sampson and Lauritsen (1997) provide a
more detailed critique of many of these theories. While the various arguments presented here can
account to some degree for the racial disparities in overall crime perpetration, none are able to
address the striking fact that black-on-white robbery rates are vastly greater than white-on-black
robbery rates. Furthermore, these are theories of crime in general rather than robbery in particular.
Hence they cannot account for the rise in the proportion of robberies with injury as overall robbery
rates have fallen, and cannot address racial disparities in the likelihood of resistance and violence.
226.1 Characteristics
The most popular way to explain racial disparities in crime is to point to some particular charac-
teristic, assert that this characteristic causes a disproportionate propensity to engage in crime, and
show that African-Americans are more likely than whites to have this characteristic. Examples of
characteristics that might be used in this way are: having grown up without a father present, being
poor, being poorly educated, having lower scores on measures of ￿intelligence￿ , and owning a gun.
In this view, characteristics are the link between race and crime: conditional on having one or more
of them, blacks should be no more or less likely to commit crime than whites or Hispanics.21
These explanations fail because it is impossible to explain the racial disparity in robbery unless
you can explain why blacks are more likely to commit robbery conditional on these characteristics.
Robbery arrests are far more concentrated on African-Americans than are any of these characteris-
tics. As noted in the introduction, blacks are over eight times as likely as whites to be arrested for
robbery. Yet black children are only 2.56 times as likely as white to live with a single parent (Sta-
tistical Abstract 2000, table 70), blacks between 18 and 35 are only 1.90 times as likely to be poor
as whites of similar age, and blacks are less likely to own guns than whites, both unconditionally
and conditional on a long list of standard variables, including urban or rural residence (Glaeser and
Glendon 1998).
Notice that equal concentration is only a necessary condition for characteristic stories such as
these to work. Even if blacks were eight times as likely as whites to be poor, for instance, poverty
di⁄erentials would explain the robbery arrest disparity only if the non-poor were never arrested
for robbery. Thus Lochner and Moretti (2004) ￿nd that equalizing black and white educational
attainment would eliminate only 23% of the racial incarceration gap (which is smaller than the
racial robbery arrest gap).22
Considering the interaction among several characteristics moves us no closer to an explanation.
In general, a story about interaction between two characteristics can explain more than the stronger
of two simple characteristics stories only in two special circumstances: either crime depends on the
intersection and the characteristics are much more strongly correlated among blacks than among
21Note that in our model, blacks and whites with identical non-racial characteristics (as represented by ￿) will
behave di⁄erently in equilibrium, since their racial characteristics alone are su¢ cient to in￿ uence beliefs and hence
the actions of those with whom they interact.
22This is their OLS result. They do not report similar calculations for the more sophisticated regressions that
they run, but those regressions lead them to conclude that OLS produces a reasonably accurate measurement of the
impact of education on crime.
23whites; or crime depends on the union and the characteristics are much more strongly correlated
among whites than among blacks. Analogous conditions hold for 3-way, and n-way interaction. We
have found no evidence that either of these special circumstances holds for any set of characteristics.
6.2 Under-deterrence and Social Osmosis
Economic theories of crime emphasize how the probability and severity of punishment deter poten-
tial wrong-doers. Under-deterrence, therefore, is a potential explanation for black crime￿ perhaps
African-Americans commit more crimes because they are less afraid of the consequences. This is the
operative mechanism is Sah￿ s (1994) ￿social osmosis￿theory of crime, for instance￿ neighborhoods
with many criminals in them overwhelm the police; this lowers the probability of apprehension, and
so perpetuates and exacerbates disparities. This hypothesis also appears in Anderson (1999). His
argument is that lawlessness prevails in black neighborhoods because the police have abandoned
them and do not treat black-on-black crime su¢ ciently seriously.
The greatest problem that an under-deterrence theory of racial disparities encounters is that
there is no evidence that African-American criminals face lower probabilities of apprehension or less
severe punishments. If such were the case, African-Americans would be more heavily represented
among o⁄enders identi￿ed by victims than among arrestees or prisoners. That is not the pattern
we see.
Racial disparities in judicial processing have been studied extensively, and the consensus is that
blacks are not treated more leniently than whites. Ayres and Waldfogel (2003) ￿nd that African-
Americans are forced to pay discriminatorily high bail. The U. S. O¢ ce of Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention (1999, p. 3) concluded from a review of many studies that ￿there is sub-
stantial evidence that minority youth are treated di⁄erently from majority youth within the juvenile
justice system￿ ￿ being more likely to be placed in public secure facilities, for instance, rather than
private facilities or diversion, even considering the severity of the crime and other factors. Sampson
and Lauritsen (1997) review the literature on adult case disposition and sentencing. They conclude
(p. 355):
When restricted to index crimes, dozens of individual-level studies have shown that a
direct in￿ uence of race on pretrial release, plea bargaining, conviction, sentence length,
and death penalty among adults is small to nonexistent once legally relevant variables
(e.g., prior record) are controlled.
24Nor is it plausible to argue that blacks commit more crimes against blacks because their victims
are less likely to call the police. Black robbery victims are slightly more likely to report the crime,
but the di⁄erence was not statistically signi￿cant (NCVS 2002, table 94). If police did not treat
black victimization as seriously as white, we would expect to see more white-on-black robbery than
black-on-white, when in fact the opposite is the case.
The second problem with an under-deterrence theory of racial disparities is that elasticities
of crime with respect to deterrence measures are so small that disparities in apprehension and
punishment would have to be very great to explain any substantial portion of the disparity. Most
econometric estimates (for instance, Witte 1980) put the elasticity of o⁄enses with respect to the
probability of arrest or imprisonment in the range of 0.3 to 0.5. Almost certainly it is less than
unity. But only if the elasticity of o⁄enses is greater than unity can weaker deterrence explain more
per capita arrests. With this elasticity less than unity, a group with a lower threat of arrests would
have fewer arrests, not more.
Econometric estimates of the elasticity of o⁄enses with respect to length of sentences generally
￿nd that it is lower than the elasticity with respect to arrest probability (￿certainty matters more
than severity￿ ) and often ￿nd that it is very small. Suppose that this elasticity is 0.3￿ a very
high estimate. Then African-Americans would commit twice as many o⁄enses as whites only if
their punishment was roughly a tenth of white expected punishment. And African-Americans
would commit eight times as many robberies only if whites were punished a thousand times more
severely. Considering the volume of research on racial sentence disparities, it is inconceivable that
a discrepancy of this magnitude could have been overlooked.
Thus traditional deterrence theory is of little use in explaining racial disparities, and any more
imaginative reconstruction (de￿ning the severity of punishment di⁄erently, for instance) has very
large obstacles to overcome.
6.3 Culture of Violence
Another explanation is that African-American sub-culture is to blame. According to this view,
African-Americans live in a sub-culture distinct from the rest of American society, one in which
crime, aggressive behaviors, and illegitimate activities are not strongly condemned. Even if this
argument is not taken as a tautology, there are a number of empirical di¢ culties. Social surveys
do not reveal major di⁄erences between blacks and whites on attitudes toward crime (Sampson
and Lauritsen, 1997, p. 332). Blacks are decidedly more pious and religiously observant than
25whites, even holding income and education constant (Iannaccone 1998). Freeman (1996) shows that
religious youth are less likely to engage in crime. Blacks are less likely to drink, and considerably
less likely to abuse alcohol (SAMHSA, 2002). Alcohol is closely linked to violence (Cook and
Moore 1993, 2000; Chaloupka and Sa⁄er 1993; Fagan 1993; Markowitz 2000a, 2000b; Markowitz
and Grossman 1999a, 1999b). The only hard evidence for a sub-culture of violence, it seems, is
violent crime￿ the phenomenon the sub-culture story is supposed to be explaining.
A culture of violence should mean a culture in which families ￿ght. Yet in 2002, blacks were
slightly less likely than whites to be victims of violent crimes committed by family members (1.9
per 1000 population 12 or over for blacks, versus 2.0 for whites). Since family violence is decreasing
in income, a regression would probably show that ￿African-American sub-culture￿decreases family
violence (NCVS, 2004, table 35).
The sub-culture explanation also fails to explain why African-Americans are more heavily over-
represented in certain crimes than in others. Drug tra¢ cking, gambling, prostitution, receiving
stolen property, and motor vehicle theft are all less violent (and more pro￿table ￿nancially) than
rape and assault, but African-Americans are more heavily over-represented in the former crimes
than in the latter.
6.4 Physical Size
Group di⁄erences in physical size cannot account for di⁄erences in robbery rates, for the simple
reason that African-American men are no larger than white men of comparable age. On average,
black men between 20 and 39 are slightly lighter than non-Hispanic white men (189.1 pounds for
African-Americans vs. 189.7 for non-Hispanic whites), and slightly shorter (70.1 inches vs. 70.2
inches). Both di⁄erences are statistically insigni￿cant. The mean body mass index is virtually
identical across groups (Ogden et al., 2004, tables 11, 13 and 15). Since body mass index is a
nonlinear function of height and weight, it is unlikely that higher moments of the black and white
bivariate distributions of height and weight di⁄er greatly.
6.5 Adverse Selection
Loury (2002) develops a model of adverse selection to explain why cab drivers fear black men.
Out of fear, cab drivers make black men wait longer, and so robbers end up disproportionately
represented among the black men who endure and get a cab. This is because robbers gain more
from a cab ride than regular passengers do, and so are willing to wait longer. This is an equilibrium
26in which cab drivers￿ s stereotype of black men as robbers is con￿rmed.
While this model accounts for discriminatory treatment, it predicts that within the population
of passengers white men rob cabs more often than black men do. Robbing cabs is easier for white
men than for black, because they do not have to wait as long, and proportionately more of them
do it (although robbers are a smaller fraction of riders). Thus a generalization of Loury￿ s model
does not predict that blacks will be disproportionately involved in robbery.
6.6 Social Interaction
Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman (GSS) (1996) observe that the spatial variation in crime is
greater than traditional economic and demographic variables can explain, and develop a theory
of social interaction. No matter what your background, if your neighborhood is full of criminals,
you￿ re much more likely to become a criminal, too. Since many African-Americans live in segregated
neighborhoods with much crime, a theoretical model where social interaction among criminals led
to disproportionate African-American criminality probably could be developed.
Such a model, however, would not be able to explain GSS￿ s empirical results on particular
index crimes. If social interaction explained African-American involvement in crime, then social
interaction should be most powerful for the index crimes African-Americans commit relatively
most￿ murder and robbery￿ and least powerful for those they commit relatively least￿ burglary
and assault. Instead, GSS conclude that social interaction is of almost negligible power for murder,
and only modest power for robbery. Social interaction is of greatest importance for motor vehicle
theft, a crime of moderate African-American disproportion, and theft, a crime of little disproportion.
7 Conclusions
The idea that racial stereotypes can have incentive e⁄ects that result in systematic di⁄erences
across groups in behavior dates back to the seminal work of Arrow (1973) and Phelps (1972).
Early applications of this idea focused on labor markets, and addressed racial disparities in wages,
job assignment, and human capital acquisition. In order for the theory of statistical discrimination
to be operative, however, it is necessary that the characteristics in question be both unobservable
and responsive to economic incentives. As noted by (Akerlof, 1976, p.608), there are ￿di¢ culties in
applying this model to real-world racial discrimination￿in labor markets since characteristics such
as education and experience are generally observable at little cost, while traits such as punctuality
27and initiative, being acquired in early childhood, are relatively unresponsive to wage di⁄erentials.
This suggests that the theory of statistical discrimination may be most relevant to sporadic, anony-
mous interactions in which payo⁄-relevant characteristics are necessarily unobservable, and where
potential gains and losses can be signi￿cant. The crime of robbery satis￿es all of these criteria.
Our theory of racial disparities in the incidence of robbery, resistance, and violence is based
on the idea that group inequality can a⁄ect incentives in ways that induce otherwise identical in-
dividuals to behave di⁄erently in equilibrium.23 Victims entertain the belief that black o⁄enders,
being drawn from a population with lower levels of income, are more likely than whites to respond
violently to resistance. This lowers their incentives to resist and makes crime more lucrative for
non-violent black o⁄enders who bene￿t from (but do not ￿t) the stereotype. The result is dispropor-
tionate involvement of blacks in robbery. For similar reasons, potential robbers believe that black
victims are more likely than whites to resist attempts at robbery. This makes them less attractive
targets, and explains the huge gap between black-on-white relative to white-on-black crime. An
implication of the disparity in crime rates is that black victims face a group of o⁄enders that is on
the whole more violent; this prediction of the model is roughly consistent with the empirical record.
One limitation of our work is that potential victims make only one decision￿ whether or not to
resist a robbery attempt. In practice, potential victims can employ a variety of strategies (Ehrlich,
1981 and Cook, 1986). In particular, they can employ costly precautions to avoid being victims of
crime at all. Such avoidance behavior explains in part why the old, the rich, and women are less
likely to be robbery victims. Allowing victims to take costly precautions is an obvious extension to
our model. If moving to areas with few robbers is cheaper for whites than for blacks, then ceteris
paribus the resistance rates for whites who do not move should be higher. This could explain one
of our empirical anomalies. More importantly, racial asymmetry in robbery can then lead to racial
segregation and discrimination in housing markets.
Finally, we have assumed throughout that beliefs held by both victims and perpetrators are
self-ful￿lling in equilibrium. This is the hallmark of the economic approach: behavior is optimal
given the beliefs that individuals hold, and beliefs are accurate, given the behavior that they in-
duce. Psychologists have long recognized, however, that ￿stereotypes based on relatively enduring
characteristics of the person (such as race, religion and gender) have enormous potential for error￿
23The idea group inequality can result in di⁄erential outcomes for otherwise identical blacks and whites appears
also in Sethi and Somanathan (2004), where it is shown that in stable sorting equilibria blacks experience lower
neighborhood quality than whites of comparable income.
28(Hilton and von Hippel, 1996, p. 241). There are a number of channels through which inaccu-
rate stereotypes can arise and persist. Once activated, stereotypes can in￿ uence attentiveness to
new information, the interpretation of ambiguous information, the behavior of the holder towards
the target of the stereotype, and the standards against which the behavior of the target is judged
(Hamilton et al., 1994). To the extent that the holder is more receptive to stereotype-con￿rming in-
formation, and tends to interpret ambiguous information in a manner that is stereotype-consistent,
beliefs about group characteristics can persist even if they are inaccurate. Such considerations
strengthen rather than undermine the conclusions drawn in this paper. The existence of an inac-
curate but persistent stereotype of black male violence, for instance, would result in qualitatively
similar but quantitatively greater racial disparities in crime rates relative to the predictions of our
analysis. We consider the explicit introduction of such psychological perspectives into models of
economic behavior to be a promising direction for future research.
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Proof of Proposition 1. First we show that ￿￿ < 1 in any equilibrium. Suppose, instead, that








= F(￿ ￿) < 1;
















: Note that ’ is increasing in ￿￿; since ~ ￿(￿) and ^ ￿(￿) are both
decreasing and F (￿) and G(￿) are both increasing. Furthermore, ’(0) = 0 and ’(1) = 1: The




= 0 (facing certain violence, all victims comply) and
F(^ ￿(0)) = 1 (facing certain compliance, all robbers confront). Hence there is a unique value of
￿￿ 2 (0;1) that satis￿es the equilibrium condition (11). This implies a unique equilibrium value of
￿￿ from (4).




The function ~ ￿(￿￿) is una⁄ected by the change in z1, since it is de￿ned implicitly by
x2(~ ￿) = ￿z2(~ ￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)y2(~ ￿);
and the functions x2; y2; and z2 are all unchanged. The function ^ ￿(￿￿) is also una⁄ected, since it
is de￿ned implicitly by
























in equilibrium. Since ~ ￿ and ^ ￿ are both




in a lower ￿￿: From this, (4), and the fact that ~ ￿ is a decreasing function, we know that ￿￿ must
rise. The overall crime rate ￿￿ = F(^ ￿(￿￿)) therefore falls, since the decreasing function ^ ￿ has not
shifted while ￿￿ has risen.
A downward shift in x1 (￿) has no e⁄ect on the ~ ￿(￿) function, but the ^ ￿(￿) function shifts down
(for any given beliefs about resistance fewer robberies are attempted). This follows from the fact




, there is no change in y1 (￿); and x1 (￿)




is una⁄ected by the downward shift in x1 (￿); ^ ￿(￿) has shifted down, and the left-hand-side
of (6) is increasing in ￿￿: Higher ￿￿ implies lower ￿￿ from (4), the fact that ~ ￿(￿) is decreasing, and
has not been shifted. The overall crime rate ￿￿ = F(^ ￿(￿￿)) must be lower (otherwise ￿￿ could not
have risen, given that F(￿ ￿) is the same).




results in a decline in ^ ￿(￿): This follows from the fact that ^ ￿(￿) is




, there is no change in x1 (￿); and y1 (￿) is increasing
and has shifted up. There is no e⁄ect on either ~ ￿(￿) or F
￿￿ ￿
￿
. Taken together, this implies from (6)
that ￿￿ is higher in equilibrium, and hence from (4) that ￿￿ is lower (since ~ ￿(￿) has not shifted).
The overall crime rate ￿￿ = F(^ ￿(￿￿)) must be lower (otherwise ￿￿ could not have risen, given that
F(￿ ￿) is the same).
Proof of Proposition 3. A uniform deterrence increase leaves the function ~ ￿(￿) unchanged, since
it depends only on victim payo⁄ functions. A uniform deterrence increase also leaves the value ￿ ￿
unchanged, since it is implicitly de￿ned by the equation y1(￿) = z1(￿), both sides of which increase
by the same amount k. Hence F(￿ ￿) is unchanged. The function ^ ￿(￿), however, is changed. In
particular it shifts down for all ￿: the threshold value at which potential robbers are willing to
attempt robbery falls. Since ^ ￿(￿) falls and the other functions de￿ning ’(￿) remain the same,






as in the proof of Proposition 1.) Since ’(￿)
is increasing, it follows from (6) that ￿￿ increases. Since ￿￿ increases, ￿￿ = G(￿(￿￿)) falls. Since
￿￿ = F(￿ ￿)=￿￿; by de￿nition, ￿￿ falls.
Proof of Proposition 4. With all payo⁄ functions unchanged, there is no shift in the threshold
￿ ￿ or in the functions ^ ￿(￿) and ~ ￿(￿): The share of violent types in the population as a whole, F
￿￿ ￿
￿
must fall. Suppose, by way of contradiction, the the crime rate ￿￿ = F(^ ￿(￿￿)) does not fall.
Then from (5), ￿￿ must be lower, and hence from (4), ￿￿ must be higher. But since ^ ￿(￿￿) is a
decreasing function and F (￿) has shifted down, this implies a lower crime rate ￿￿ = F(^ ￿(￿￿)); a
contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 5. Consider the condition (6) with the new distribution H but the old









> H(￿ ￿). (12)


































































This establishes the claim (12). The new equilibrium value of ￿ is de￿ned by ￿H(^ ￿(G(~ ￿(￿))) =
H(￿ ￿): Since ￿H(^ ￿(G(~ ￿(￿))) is an increasing function of ￿, (12) implies that the new equilibrium
value of ￿ must be smaller than ￿￿. Since the function ~ ￿(￿) is unchanged and decreasing, (4) implies
that the new equilibrium value of ￿ is higher.
Proof of Proposition 6. The ￿rst step is to show that both changes reduce G(~ ￿(￿)) for all ￿. For
the rightward shift in the distribution of victim types, this result is obvious, since the function ~ ￿(￿)
does not change. Greater expected cost of violence shifts the ~ ￿(￿) down, and so reduces G(~ ￿(￿)).
Since ^ ￿(￿) is a decreasing function, ’(￿) = ￿F(^ ￿(G(~ ￿(￿)))) rises for all ￿. Hence ’(￿￿) > F(￿ ￿).
Since ’(￿) is an increasing function, ￿￿ must fall. From (5) and F(￿ ￿) unchanged, ￿￿ ￿ F(^ ￿(￿￿))
must rise. Since ^ ￿ is a decreasing function and F is increasing, ￿￿ must fall.







: Now suppose (by way of contradiction) that ￿￿
bj ￿ ￿￿









by de￿nition, so from (7), we obtain ￿bj > ￿wj: Since ~ ￿(￿) is decreasing and
Gj (￿) is increasing, this implies ￿bj < ￿wj from (8). But since ^ ￿(￿) is decreasing, Fw is increasing,





























wj for all j 2 fb:wg:
Now suppose that Fb (￿) is strongly tougher than Fw (￿); so Fw (￿)=Fb (￿) is nondecreasing.













> Fw(￿ ￿). (13)






































































































Since ￿Fw(^ ￿(Gj(~ ￿(￿))) is an increasing function of ￿, (13) implies that ￿￿
wj < ￿￿
bj. Since the function
~ ￿(￿) is unchanged and decreasing, and Gj is increasing, (8) then implies that ￿￿
wj > ￿￿
bj.
Proof of Proposition 8. Suppose Gb (￿) > Gw (￿) for all ￿ 2 ￿ and suppose (by way of
contradiction) that ￿￿
iw ￿ ￿￿











: From (7), therefore, ￿ib ￿ ￿iw: Using this, together with (8) and the facts that ~ ￿(￿) is





















ib: Using this, the fact that ^ ￿(￿) is decreasing and Fi is increasing for each


















iw for all i 2 fb:wg:
To obtain the results for ￿ and ￿; recall that for any i;j 2 fb;wg; ￿Fi(^ ￿(Gj(~ ￿(￿)))) is increasing























































33Since ￿Fi(^ ￿(Gw(~ ￿(￿)))) is increasing in ￿; it must be the case that ￿￿
ib > ￿￿
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